McCulley: The Paradox of Deleveraging will be Broken

Monday, November 24th, 2008

Paul McCulley, Managing Director and Portfolio Manager, PIMCO, earlier this year wrote a landmark discussion piece titled, “The Paradox of Deleveraging,” in which he postulated that the deleveraging of the credit market would have a profoundly negative impact that only a government sponsored plan could subdue, as no other party could be big enough to slay the affliction of credit abuse in the housing, investment and banking industries. Here is the follow up:

I’ve only written this essay once since the Kansas City Fed’s annual symposium in late August.1 But it hasn’t been because I’ve been lazy. Rather, I’ve been working virtually around the clock ever since, in my day job as head of PIMCO’s Money Market and Funding Desk. On Wall Street, this desk is frequently viewed as a backwater, a temporary home for new MBAs getting their feet wet before moving on to higher-value-added desks, or a retirement home for those with more senior moments than fresh ideas.

That’s never the case here at PIMCO, even though a number of now PIMCO partners spent their first days trafficking in the money markets and I, of ever-graying hair, still make my home here in the early hours of the day. Money markets frequently are a backwater, except when they are not, in which case they are cascading rapids. Liquidity pressures inevitably are the precursor of solvency and/or going-concern problems. Just ask Wall Street’s independent investment banks.

We here at PIMCO have always known this. Accordingly, we’ve always been conservative beyond conservative in our money market operations, on both sides of the balance sheet - no asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) for us, and no tri-party repo without regard to collateral types or haircuts either. Meat and potatoes only, no fancy garnishes necessary. But the meat and potatoes must be cooked properly.

Hence, the work load of PIMCO’s money market and funding desk. My new deputy, Jerome Schneider, hit the ground running in early August, a most propitious time, just before the global money markets became not just cascading rapids, but roaring waterfalls. The financial world will never be the same after the U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve’s fateful decision of the weekend of September 13-14 to stand aside as Lehman Brothers plummeted to death on the rocks below.

Whether that decision was the right one or not, we will never know. Yes, I know that many are quick to take the Treasury and the Federal Reserve to task, maintaining that the on-going global financial crisis - and, thus, growth crisis - would not be nearly so severe if Lehman had been tossed a life line. I simply don’t know. What I do know is that the global financial system was fundamentally broken long before Lehman’s watery death.

Thus, I believe the powerful, systemic policy responses that have unfolded in the post-Lehman world were destined to come about. Lehman was but the unfortunate tipping point. My heart still aches for the pain suffered by my many friends there. Fate is not always fair and at times, is arbitrary and capricious.

But what ailed Lehman was but a manifestation of what ailed, and ails the global financial intermediary system: the presumption that grossly levered positions in illiquid assets can always be funded, because those doing the funding will always assume the borrower is a going concern.

To understand the nature of this systemic malady, we need to return to first principles. Bear with me, please; this is going to be a bit academic. But, I submit, it was the loss of understanding of first principles that lies at the heart of the on-going paradox of deleveraging, which is the proximate cause of the on-going downward spiral of asset and debt deflation.

The Nature of Banking
When I studied the origins of banking in college, we started with the Medici Family of 15th century Italy. I’m quite sure banking existed long before then, just that I haven’t studied it. But regardless of the origins of banking, its founding premise has always been the same: In normal times, the public’s collective, ex ante demand for access to at-par, immediately-available bank money is always greater than the sum of the public’s individual, ex post demand for access to such liquidity.

Thus, the genius of banking, if you want to call it that, is simple: a bank can take more risk on the asset side of its balance sheet than the liability side can notionally support, because a goodly portion of the liability side, notably deposits, is de facto of perpetual maturity, although it is notionally of finite maturity, as short as one day in the case of demand deposits.

It’s the same alchemy that permits mutual funds to commit to next-day redemption at tonight’s NAV, even though all reasonable people know that a mutual fund - with the possible exception of a money market fund - could not possibly liquidate all assets on the wire tomorrow at tonight’s NAV marks. Systemically, it’s the illusion of liquidity, as so elegantly described by John Maynard Keynes:

“The spectacle of modern investment markets has sometimes moved me towards the conclusion that to make the purchase of an investment permanent and indissoluble, like marriage, except by reason of death or other grave cause, might be a useful remedy for our contemporary evils. For this would force the investor to direct his mind to the long-term prospects and to those only. But a little consideration of this expedient brings us up against a dilemma, and shows us how the liquidity of investment markets often facilitates, though it sometimes impedes, the course of new investment.

For the fact that each individual investor flatters himself that his commitment is ‘liquid’ (though this cannot be true for all investors collectively) calms his nerves and makes him much more willing to run a risk. If individual purchases of investments were rendered illiquid, this might seriously impede new investment, so long as alternative ways in which to hold his savings are available to the individual. This is the dilemma.

So long as it is open to the individual to employ his wealth in hoarding or lending money, the alternative of purchasing actual capital assets cannot be rendered sufficiently attractive (especially to the man who does not manage the capital assets and knows very little about them), except by organizing markets wherein these assets can be easily realized for money.”2

Yes, liquidity for all at last night’s marks is an illusion. But for banks, unlike mutual funds, it’s not so much an illusion after all, for two simple reasons: banks have access to deposit insurance underwritten by fiscal authorities and to a discount window underwritten by the monetary authority (and one step removed, the fiscal authority). Thus, banks are unique institutions, providing a “public good:”

*
Liquidity on demand at par for their depositors, because of the safety net underwritten by the sovereign, yet
*
The ability to invest in longer-dated, more risky, not-always-at-par loans and securities, because the existence and credibility of the public safety net systemically renders the public’s ex post demand for liquidity at par below the public’s ex ante demand.

Yes, banking with a sovereign safety net against deposit runs is a really cool business. Indeed, the difference between the public’s ex post and ex ante demand for at-par liquidity could be called the banking system’s “float,” similar to that of a Buffet-style insurance company.

But since it’s a really cool business and since the sovereign providing the liquidity safety net is a de facto equity partner in the business, the sovereign quite rationally wants a say in how the business is run - the degree of leverage, corporate governance, risk management controls, etc. Kinda like I do when I pay the insurance premium on my 19-year old son’s car. Jonnie doesn’t like it, and neither do bankers. Or would-be bankers.

Thus, both bankers and would-be bankers have, from time immemorial, sought to get the benefits of the sovereign’s liquidity safety net without shouldering the associated regulator nuisance. And I’m sure that 19-year old sons and daughters, too, have been doing the same for just as long.

Over the last three decades or so, the growth of “banking” outside formal, sovereign-regulated banking, has exploded, in something that I dubbed the Shadow Banking System.3 Loosely defined, a Shadow Bank is a levered-up financial intermediary whose liabilities are broadly perceived as of similar money-goodness and liquidity as conventional bank deposits. These liabilities could be shares of money market mutual funds; or the commercial paper of Finance Companies, Conduits and Structured Investment Vehicles; or the repo borrowings of stand-alone Investment Banks and Hedge Funds; or the senior tranches of Collateralized Debt Obligations; or a host of other similar funding instruments.

The bottom line is simple: Shadow Banks use funding instruments that are not just as good as old-fashioned sovereign-protected deposits. But it was a great gig so long as the public bought the notion that such funding instruments were “just as good” as bank deposits - more leverage, less regulation and more asset freedom were a path to (much) higher returns on equity in Shadow Banks than conventional banks.

And why did the public buy such instruments as though they were “just as good” as bank deposits? There are a host of reasons, not the least of which was lust for yield. But most fundamentally, Keynes again gives us the systemic answer (his italics, not mine):

“In practice we have tacitly agreed, as a rule, to fall back on what is, in truth, a convention. The essence of this convention - though it does not, of course, work out quite so simply - lies in assuming that the existing state of affairs will continue indefinitely, except in so far as we have specific reasons to expect a change. This does not mean that we really believe that the existing state of affairs will continue indefinitely. We know from extensive experience that this is most unlikely.

The actual results of an investment over a long term of years very seldom agree with the initial expectation. Nor can we rationalize our behavior by arguing that to a man in a state of ignorance errors in either direction are equally probable, so that there remains a mean actuarial expectation based on equi-probabilities. For it can easily be shown that the assumption of arithmetically equal probabilities based on a state of ignorance leads to absurdities.

We are assuming, in effect, that the existing market valuation, however arrived at, is uniquely correct in relation to our existing knowledge of the facts which will influence the yield of the investment, and that it will only change in proportion to changes in this knowledge; though, philosophically speaking, it cannot be uniquely correct, since our existing knowledge does not provide a sufficient basis for a calculated mathematical expectation. In point of fact, all sorts of considerations enter into the market valuations which are in no way relevant to the prospective yield. Nevertheless the above conventional method of calculation will be compatible with a considerable measure of continuity and stability in our affairs, so long as we can rely on the maintenance of the convention.

For if there exist organized investment markets and if we can rely on the maintenance of the convention, an investor can legitimately encourage himself with the idea that the only risk he runs is that of a genuine change in the news over the near future, as to the likelihood of which he can attempt to form his own judgment, and which is unlikely to be very large. For, assuming that the convention holds good, it is only these changes which can affect the value of his investment, and he need not lose his sleep merely because he has not any notion what his investment will be worth ten years hence.

Thus investment becomes reasonably “safe” for the individual investor over short periods, and hence over a succession of short periods however many, if he can fairly rely on there being no breakdown in the convention and on his therefore having an opportunity to revise his judgment and change his investment, before there has been time for much to happen. Investments which are “fixed” for the community are thus made “liquid” for the individual.

It has been, I am sure, on the basis of some such procedure as this that our leading investment markets have been developed. But it is not surprising that a convention, in an absolute view of things so arbitrary, should have its weak points. It is its precariousness which creates no small part of our contemporary problem of securing sufficient investment.”4

And so, Keynes provides the essential - and existential - answer as to why the Shadow Banking System became so large, the unraveling of which lies at the root of the current global financial system crisis. It was a belief in a convention, undergirded by the length of time it held: Shadow Bank liabilities were viewed as “just as good” as conventional bank deposits not because they are, but because they had been. And the power of this conventional thinking was aided and abetted by both the sovereign and the sovereign-blessed rating agencies.

Until, of course, convention was turned on its head, starting with a run on the ABCP market in August 2007, the near death of Bear Stearns in March 2008, the de facto nationalization of Fannie and Freddie in July, and the actual death of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Maybe, just maybe, there was and is something special about a real bank, as opposed to a Shadow Bank!

And indeed that is unambiguously the case, as evidenced by the on-going partial re-intermediation of the Shadow Banking System back into the sovereign-supported conventional banking system, as well as the mad scramble by remaining Shadow Banks to convert themselves into conventional banks, so as to eat at the same sovereign-subsidized capital and liquidity cafeteria as their former stodgy brethren.

The new conventional wisdom: levered capitalism is good, and made even better with a bit of socialism to protect the downside.

Well Maybe
I’m quite sure that last sentence is not going to sit well with some of you. It’s not supposed to sit well. It doesn’t sit well with me, I must acknowledge, nay confess. Like most of us, I’ve always had a separation in my mind between strictly capitalist activities and strictly public activities. Not that the demarcation is always clean. But it’s a useful way of thinking.

As far as I know, the place where I buy my fishing tackle is a capitalist outfit. If we customers don’t buy enough rods and reels, the owner will go broke; his operation is simply not systemically important enough to be bailed out by the taxpayers, including my neighbors who don’t fish. In contrast, the local Department of Motor Vehicles, sometimes called the DMV, is unambiguously not a capitalist outfit, but a public outfit. It cannot go broke, as evidenced by our tolerance of its fluctuating service level, because it provides a public service that the private sector can’t provide. To be sure, AAA can get you new plates for your car, but you can’t renew your driver’s license at the AAA; for that, you have got to go to the monopoly called the DMV.

Well actually, that’s not entirely true, either. The DMV is actually an oligopoly, with offices in many surrounding neighborhoods. And rumor has it here that the service is a lot quicker at the San Clemente office than the Costa Mesa office, which serves Newport Beach. So the consumer does have the choice of driving to San Clemente, a form of time arbitrage versus going to the Costa Mesa office. However, rumor also has it that this rumored better service in San Clemente is so widespread that, as Yogi Berra might say, the San Clemente office has become so popular nobody goes there anymore.

But you get the point: there is private enterprise and there is public enterprise. And then there is banking, a hybrid of the two. There is no way ‘round this, for good or bad, because fractional reserve banking depends upon the sovereign’s safety net against liability runs, a safety net that the private sector definitionally can’t universally supply. In this sense, the safety net is like national defense: we all need it, but since nobody individually has the incentive to pay for it, we collectively tax ourselves to pay for it.

Yes, sometimes we collectively end up paying $800 for military toilet seats, as was the case about 25 years ago. But that doesn’t change the proposition that public goods do exist, and a stable system of intermediation of private savings into private investment is indeed a public good. The maturity transformation power of a fractional reserve banking system provides an unambiguous benefit to society and as such, must be underwritten by society.

Bottom Line
I could regale you yet again about the power of the analytical thinking of Hyman Minsky, complete with his Forward Journey turning into his Moment, followed by his Reverse Journey.5 But I don’t need to do that any more: we’ve collectively lived it and are now caught in the debt-deflationary pathologies of “the paradox of deleveraging.”6 Not everybody in the private sector can delever at the same time without creating a depression. Accordingly, the sovereign must go the other way, levering up the public balance sheet. And Washington has finally started to do so with appropriate vigor and enthusiasm.

It’s not a pretty picture. In fact, it’s repugnant, giving proof to the proposition that breaking the paradox of deleveraging does involve socializing the downside of previously profitable private sector activities. In a recent speech, I called it “creeping socialism” and was interrupted by an irate, older man in the back of the room bellowing, “It ain’t creeping socialism, it’s galloping socialism!” I really didn’t have a soothing come back, noting that many things are what they are only in the eye of the beholder. But his point wasn’t lost on me or anybody else in the room.

And it is not lost on Washington, DC either, I can assure you. If the sovereign must backstop a private sector activity that produces a public good, then the sovereign will, at least in a democracy, rightfully demand both bottom-up and macro-prudential rules to harness the greed that lubricates the invisible hand of capitalism. Yes, the visible fist of government and the invisible hand are presently engaged in a massive arm wrestling contest in the provision of financial services. And the fist is winning.

At least for now. Capitalism, and especially financial market capitalism, brought this outcome upon itself through greed and hubris. Capitalism is now re-grouping and learning how to play by new rules, which are still being written. And ultimately, I’m sure, capitalistic bankers will once again bend those rules in the pursuit of higher profitability. And that’s okay, I think. In the end, we really don’t want to turn our banking system into the DMV. At the same time, we also don’t want our banking system to be nothing more than a betting parlor.

Or, in the famous words of Keynes again:

“Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise. But the position is serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation. When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done.”

Paul A. McCulley
Managing Director
November 13, 2008

You can download a complete PDF here.

People who read this post also read these:

• Words from the (investment) wise for the week that was (November 24 – 30, 2008)
• Words from the (investment) wise for the week that was (November 17 – 23, 2008)
• Bill Ackman: Pershing Square Q3 2008 Letter
• Is There a Bull Market Somewhere?
• Credit Crisis Observations

Tags: Amp, Banking System, Banks, Bear Stearns, Blog, capitalism, Credit, Credit Market, Desc, EFU, Fed, Federal Reserve, Focus, Hedge Fund, Hedge Funds, Investment Banks, Italy, Journey, Lehman Brothers, liquidity, Market Cap, Markets, Mutual Funds, oil, Paul McCulley, PIMCO, risk, Valuations, Value, Wall Street, Water, wisdom
Posted in Markets | No Comments »

Governments Keep Making Mistakes: Jim Rogers

Wednesday, October 22nd, 2008

Jim Rogers, CEO, Rogers Holdings, appeared on CNBC’s European Squawk Box this morning with Geoff Cutmore, to discuss the progress of markets and his outlook.

click image for video

Rogers stated that the economy is in for high inflation given the size and nature of the central bank interventions and injections in to the financial system, and pre-ambles this saying,

“The world is unfolding. The American government keeps making mistake after mistake after mistake. Other governments do too. Unfortunately this is going to be a mess,” Jim Rogers, CEO of Rogers Holdings said Wednesday.

“Bernanke, and Paulson and the guy at the NY Fed, Tim G-r-eithner [or whatever his name is: slips Rogers] have been wrong every week for the last two years. Why do you think they know what they’re doing?”

He has covered most of his “shorts,” and wishes that he had not yet covered them, as their has been more downside.

He is long short-term US government bonds and short and shorting long term government bonds as he believes that we are heading for inflation. He has been buying agricultural commodities, though he admits that his timing is bad, as they are down.

“I bought some more agriculture earlier this week and it promptly went down. The fundamentals for commodities and agriculture have not changed,” says Rogers. “What’s happening in the world right now means that there will be less supply of everything coming out of this, and nobody can get a loan for a new zinc mine or a loan to increase their crop production.”

Rogers adds that

“What’s happening now is that we are in a period of forced liquidation; we’ve had 8 or 10 of these in the last 100-150 years; 1929 in the US, 1974 in the UK…We’ve had these before. The things that come out on the other side have always been the things that are unimpaired. The US financial system is impaired. The investment banking system is impaired.”

“But, commodities and agriculture are totally unimpaired by all of this. If history’s any guide, the things to buy will be the things that are doing fine; water treatment in Asia [for example], agriculture’s gonna do fine; that’s what you should buy.” Rogers adds, “However, my timing’s not very good.”

Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke should resign for keeping alive “zombie banks” that should be allowed to fail, he said.

The Japanese government refused to let financial institutions fail in the 1990s, Rogers said.

“It’s 18 years later and their stock market is 75 or 80 percent below what it was 18 years ago,” he added.

Rogers also said that interest-rate cuts are coming.

“I know we are going to get aggressive rate cuts everywhere, that’s why I’m long short-term government bonds in the U.S., but shorting long-term government bonds because it’s not going to help, it’s going to add to inflation.”

Source: CNBC

People who read this post also read these:

• Words from the (investment) wise for the week that was (November 24 – 30, 2008)
• Words from the (investment) wise for the week that was (November 17 – 23, 2008)
• Byron Wien’s Ten Predictions for 2008 and what he predicted for 2007
• ‘Encouraged by a wicked wizard, Greenspan, Bernanke toils at his printing press’
• Mark Mobius Talks Brazil, Emerging Markets

Tags: Agricultural commodities, Agriculture, Amp, Asia, Banking System, Banks, Bernanke, Commodities, Economy, EFU, Euro, Fed, Federal Reserve, Federal Reserve Chairman, Government Bonds, inflation, Japan, Jim Rogers, Markets, Paulson, risk, UK, Us Government, Video, Water
Posted in Commodities, Markets | No Comments »

Is There a Bull Market Somewhere?

Wednesday, September 24th, 2008

Not likely, according to PIMCO’s Bill Gross. In his most recent Investment Outlook, Gross, reasons and opposes (for now) the idea that in the very different worlds of Louis Rukeyser, Jim Cramer, and Jim Grant, “There’s always a bull market somewhere!”

While he does agree that there are always stocks, bonds, and currencies that can be found to be going up, while markets are going down, Gross cautions:

So the lesson must be to go forth and find the bull market, wherever it is. Almost always – but NOT NOW, because in a global financial marketplace in the process of delevering, assets that go up in price are rare diamonds as opposed to grains of sand. For the past several months our PIMCO Investment Committee blackboard has continued to display the following lesson plan:

What Happens During Delevering

1. Risk spreads, liquidity spreads, volatility, term premiums – they all go up.
2. Delevering slows/stops when assets have been liquidated and/or sufficient capital has been raised to produce an equilibrium.
3. The raising of sufficient capital now depends on the entrance of new balance sheets. Absent that, prices of almost all assets will go down.

Essentially, Gross’ thesis is that as the GSEs, banks, investment banks and global hedge funds delever their balance sheets, they also lower the prices of all securities that can be arbitraged within the marketplace. 

The 10% year over year decline in prices has not been witnessed since the great depression, and that is a red flag.

a 10% aggregate asset price decline does more than make us all 10% less wealthy. Because many of these assets are leveraged and margined, the more they decline, the more frequent and frenzied the margin calls, and if the additional cash flow is not provided, not only an asset liquidation but a debt liquidation follows. It is the debt liquidation that potentially turns a stagnant/recessionary economy into something much worse.

This rare event of systematic debt liquidation is the central issue in both the US and globally. If central bankers are unable to take effective measures, the campfire could turn into a forest fire, and a mild asset bear market could turn into a destructive financial tsunami. Gross points out that even they and their SWF and central bank counterparts who have been doing their part to stem the tide, and in some cases bought into debt issues too early, only to see those issues now priced “underwater,” are now reluctant to make additional commitments.

Paulson and Bernanke have consulted PIMCO regularly throughout the credit market debacle, and have apparently acted on some of that advice as well as that of others like Pershing Square’s Bill Ackman, who floated a Frannie bailout plan prior to the Fed’s that was eerily similar.

Paul McCulley stated in late July, that the only thing that was viable given the delevering of the market that was well underway, was for government to lever up its balance sheet, much the way it is proposing to this week, with the $700-billion TARP plan.

People who read this post also read these:

• Words from the (investment) wise for the week that was (November 24 – 30, 2008)
• Words from the (investment) wise for the week that was (November 17 – 23, 2008)
• Bill Ackman: Pershing Square Q3 2008 Letter
• McCulley: The Paradox of Deleveraging will be Broken
• Why the selloff in commodities and emerging markets?

Tags: Amp, Bailout, Banks, Bear Market, Bernanke, Bill Ackman, Bill Gross, Blog, Chart, Credit, Credit Market, Economy, Fed, Grain, GSE, Hedge Fund, Hedge Funds, Investment Banks, liquidity, Markets, Paul McCulley, Paulson, Pershing Square, PIMCO, Recession, risk, spreads, Thesis, UK, Water
Posted in Markets | No Comments »

The Bonfire of the Vanities, the Sequel

Thursday, June 26th, 2008

June 26, 2008 - Andrew Ross Sorkin, of the New York Times, writes about how prophetic Tom Wolfe’s declaration was on the day of the Blackstone debut: “We may be witnessing the end of capitalism as we know it.”

When you get to the end of an era, marking the timeline with watershed events is always therapeutic. Here are some excerpts from Sorkin’s NYTimes article:

… Mr. Wolfe must be in attendance — was that the Blackstone Group, the big private equity firm, was minutes away from going public, the largest initial public offering in the United States since 2002. (At the time, he told The New York Observer that a friend was giving him a tour.)

Just then, a CNBC reporter pulled Mr. Wolfe aside to ask him what he made of all the hubbub. Mr. Wolfe paused for a moment to contemplate his answer.

And then, with a wry smile, he delivered a prophetic declaration: “We may be witnessing the end of capitalism as we know it.”

 

One year later …

Blackstone’s stock has gone nowhere but down since it went public, dropping nearly 50 percent from its high the day it started trading. But that’s the least of it.

The once mighty Wall Street investment banks have been brought to their knees, sending out pink slips to more than 83,000 employees worldwide, racking up billions of dollars in losses as a results of their foolish forays into subprime mortgages. Bear Stearns all but went out of business before being “saved.” Some hedge funds have gone belly up.

Those lords of private equity, many of which were preparing to follow Blackstone into the public markets, have been put on semipermanent hiatus. (Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Company refuses to withdraw its I.P.O filing, almost a year after submitting it, with no immediate hope in sight.) Their deal-making has all but stopped.

As Mr. Wolfe nicely put it, “It sounds like even the firms that aren’t in trouble are in trouble.”

And, what of credit …

And yet, there has been a perverse, and misguided, optimism that somehow the situation will improve in the second half of 2008. How? Sure, the big banks may take fewer write-downs — but there is no way of knowing that. The news a few days ago that the big bond insurers were being downgraded will create new havoc — and losses — for holders of toxic subprime debt. Indeed, the bigger issue is what kind of business is going to generate any return for its investors. When you can’t lend or trade — and you can’t invest with the leverage that juiced returns to support seven- and eight-figure bonuses — how exactly are you going to make money?

“It has always interested me that the word ‘credit’ comes from the word ‘credere,’ which means ‘to believe,’ ” Mr. Wolfe said. “It only works if people believe in it.” He’s right, of course: one reason the credit markets have tanked is that people don’t believe anymore.

Complete Article:

A “Bonfire” Returns as Heartburn, Andrew Ross Sorkin, NYTimes, June 24, 2008

People who read this post also read these:

• Words from the (investment) wise for the week that was (November 24 – 30, 2008)
• Bill Ackman: Pershing Square Q3 2008 Letter
• Words from the (investment) wise for the week that was (November 17 – 23, 2008)
• More volatility coming and more ETF options
• McCulley: The Paradox of Deleveraging will be Broken

Tags: Amp, Andrew Ross Sorkin, Banks, Bear Stearns, Blackstone, capitalism, Credit, Credit Market, Credit Markets, Dealbook, Dollar, EFU, Excerpts, Financials, Hedge Fund, Hedge Funds, Investment Banks, Markets, Mortgage, New York Times, REW, risk, SMI, Tom Wolfe, Trading, Wall Street, Water
Posted in Banks, Credit Markets, Economy, Financials, Markets, Satire, US Stocks | No Comments »

Pickens: Water is the New Oil

Tuesday, June 24th, 2008

T. Boone Pickens, the legendary corporate raider and oilman believes that water is the new oil. A recent BusinessWeek article discusses his investment and and his convictions on the water supply opportunity and his company, Mesa Water’s plans. This is an interesting story, microcosmic of the critical issue and opportunity in water that is bubbling up globally.

Here are a couple of excerpts:

Into this environment comes Pickens, who made a good living for a long time extracting oil and gas and now, at 80, believes the era of fossil fuel is over. So far he has spent $100 million and eight years on his project and still has not found any city in Texas willing to buy his water. But like many others, Pickens believes there’s a fortune to be made in slaking the thirst of a rapidly growing population. If he pumps as much as he can, he could sell about $165 million worth of water to Dallas each year. “The idea that water can be sold for private gain is still considered unconscionable by many,” says James M. Olson, one of America’s preeminent attorneys specializing in water- and land-use law. “But the scarcity of water and the extraordinary profits that can be made may overwhelm ordinary public sensibilities.”

“Water is a commodity,” he says. “Heck, isn’t it like oil? You have to come back to who owns the water. The groundwater is owned by the landowner. That’s it.” When it comes to potential buyers, Pickens cares about only one thing: how much they’re willing to pay. “Do I care what Dallas does with the water? Hell no.”

Read the full article: 

There Will Be Water, Susan Berfield, BusinessWeek, June 12, 2008

People who read this post also read these:

• Rob Fraim’s Call on Energy
• Words from the (investment) wise for the week that was (November 24 – 30, 2008)
• The Bonfire of the Vanities, the Sequel
• Remain Heavily Underweight Banks
• Oil Stocks vs. Oil

Tags: 5 Million, Commodity, Excerpts, Markets, Mesa Water, oil, Oil and Gas, pickens, Scarcity, SMI, Water, water supply
Posted in Markets, Water | No Comments »

Jim Rogers: Bullish China and Commodities

Sunday, April 13th, 2008

In this week’s Barron’s interview (Jim Rogers, Light-Years Ahead of the Crowd: Interview With James B. Rogers, Private Investor), with Laurence Strauss of Barron’s, Jim Rogers, author of Investment Biker, notable hedge fund manager and former partner of George Soros discusses his point of view on China, commodities, and the US economy. Here are some excerpts: On China: 

Why are you so bullish on China?

 

China is going to be the next great country. The 19th century was the century of the U.K. The 20th century was the century of the U.S. The 21st century is going to be the century of China. Even if I’m wrong, there are 1.5 billion people who speak Chinese every day, so it’s not as if our daughter is learning Danish. Even if she winds up working in a Chinese restaurant, she is going to be the maitre d’ — not the dish washer.

 

What else intrigues you about China?

 

China was in decline for 300 years and then around 1978 Deng Xiaoping said, “OK, let’s find something new.” He reintroduced entrepreneurship and capitalism to a country that has had a long, long history of both. In China they save and invest more than 35% of their income; in America we save less than 2%. The Chinese work from dawn to dusk. When they come to work, they don’t say, “How many holidays do I get?” They want to live like we do in America and they are willing to work hard, save and invest for the future.

 

What about investment opportunities in China?

 

Perhaps the safest investment is the renminbi, the Chinese currency. I don’t see how the renminbi should not go up against the dollar, anyway, for the next several decades. Commodities, of course, are a great way to invest in China. If you have nickel, they will take you to dinner, pay for dinner and pay you on time. They have to buy commodities. And there are some industries in China that are going to do well, no matter what happens to the world economy — water treatment, for instance. China has a horrible water problem that it is doing something about.

 

What other industries in China look interesting?

 

Agriculture. Mao Zedong [who ruled China from 1949 until his death in 1976] totally ruined agriculture. China now is spending huge amounts of money trying to rebuild agriculture. The same goes for power generation. Another growing industry is tourism; the Chinese have not been able to travel for some 300 years, for a variety of reasons. But now the government is making it much easier to get passports, and they are encouraging travel.

On Commodities:

 

Are we still in the early stages of a bull market for commodities?

 

I wouldn’t say it’s early; the commodities bull market started in early 1999. There are going to be corrections — and big ones — along the way. That’s true for every bull market.

 

But nobody has brought on any new supply of anything in the past 25 or 30 years. The last gigantic oil field was discovered in the 1960s. The number of acres devoted to wheat farming has been declining for more than 30 years. Food inventories are the lowest they’ve been in 60 years.

 

 

Our colleague Gene Epstein argued in a recent Barron’s cover story that there is a huge speculative element pushing up commodities prices.

 

But where is the oil coming from that’s going to drive down prices and keep them down? We are going to have corrections, as was the case in 2001 after 9/11. Is there speculation in commodities? Of course. Whenever you have a bull market, it draws money. If the fundamentals are right, investors make money and they want to make more. But people were buying commodities for 20 years in the 1980s and 1990s and nothing happened, because the fundamentals weren’t right yet. Now that the fundamentals are right, more money is going into commodities. It will end in a bubble and hysteria. But in 2018, or whenever this bubble finally starts to peak, if I’m lucky you will call me up and I’ll say it’s time to sell commodities.

On Emerging Markets:

 

Why have you sold most of your emerging market holdings?

 

Take Africa as an example. It’s a natural- resource-based economy, so a huge fortune is going to be made there in the next 10 years. Many countries will look a lot better because they do have lots of natural resources.

 

Having said that, right now there are probably 15,000 MBAs on airplanes flying around the world looking for emerging markets, some of which are now called frontier markets. I’ve been investing in these markets for many years and all of a sudden they have a name. That’s why I have sold all my emerging markets except China and Taiwan.

 

But I hope I’m smart enough that if and when there is a big correction, I’ll be able to buy back some of those holdings.

We’ve seen the correction in emerging markets…

Finally, a comment on the US economy as a debtor nation…

 

As recently as 1987 the U.S. was a creditor nation. We are now the largest debtor nation the world has ever seen. We owe trillions. That’s with a “t.” The real problem is that that our foreign debt is increasing at a rate of $1 trillion every 15 months. You can do the arithmetic.

For a complete transcript of this article click this link: http://www.ronpaulforums.com/showthread.php?t=132805

People who read this post also read these:

• Words from the (investment) wise for the week that was (November 24 – 30, 2008)
• Words from the (investment) wise for the week that was (November 17 – 23, 2008)
• How Solid are the BRICs? (Part 2)
• Email Broadcast - January 2, 2008
• George Soros: The Worst Market Crisis in 60 Years

Tags: 15 Months, Agriculture, Amp, Barron's, capitalism, China, Commodities, Credit, Currency, Dollar, Economy, Emerging Market, Emerging Markets, Excerpts, Hedge Fund, interview, Investment, Jim Rogers, Markets, Metals, nickel, oil, Php, pst, risk, Taiwan, Trillion, US Stocks, Water
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The World in 2050

Wednesday, March 26th, 2008

Courtesy: PriceWaterhouseCoopers

March 25 /CNW/ - Long-term growth prospects for China, India and other so-called ‘E7′ economies (Brazil, Mexico, Russia, Indonesia and Turkey) remain upbeat. However according to a new report from PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) an additional 13 emerging economies also have the potential to grow significantly faster than the established OECD countries. This rapid growth creates both challenges and opportunities for Canada.

The report, The World in 2050: Beyond the BRICs: a broader look at emerging market growth prospects, suggests that China could overtake the US by 2025 to become the world’s largest economy and will continue to grow to 130% of the size of the US economy by 2050. The Indian economy could grow to almost 90% of the size of the US economy by 2050. Brazil seems likely to overtake Japan by 2050 to move into fourth place, while Russia, Mexico and Indonesia all have the growth potential to surpass the economies of Germany or the UK by the middle of this century. The most impressive economic growth could be realized by Vietnam, with a potential growth rate of almost 10% per annum in real dollar terms. This rapid growth could propel the Vietnamese economy to around 70% of the size of the UK economy by 2050.

Interestingly, Nigeria has the long-term potential to overtake South Africa as the largest African economy by 2050. This assumes that non-oil based growth policies implemented in recent years are sustained in the long-run, something that may prove to be a challenge.

“As the economies of emerging nations grow, Canada’s share of the global economy is projected to diminish,” says Edward Mansfield, an associate partner with PwC’s statistics and economics group. “To maintain our competitive position, Canadian businesses will have to differentiate through innovation and technological progress. This will require greater investments in education and capital equipment to promote the productivity gains necessary for economic growth. However, as a highly culturally diverse nation, Canada could be well positioned to capitalize on the growth of emerging markets due to well established cultural and economic links.”

http://www.pwc.com/extweb/pwcpublications.nsf/docid/146E4E4D52487154852573FA0058A179/$file/world_2050_brics.pdf

People who read this post also read these:

• Words from the (investment) wise for the week that was (November 24 – 30, 2008)
• Words from the (investment) wise for the week that was (November 17 – 23, 2008)
• Why the selloff in commodities and emerging markets?
• Morgan Stanley’s Global Outlook for 2008
• How Solid are the BRICs? (Part 2)

Tags: Brazil, BRICs, Canada, China, de-coupling, Dollar, Economi, Economics, Economy, Emerging Market, Emerging Markets, Germany, India, Investment, Japan, Markets, Metals, Mexico, oil, Rally, risk, Russia, South Africa, UK, Water
Posted in Markets | No Comments »

12 Ways to Make Your Kids Financially Saavy

Tuesday, January 8th, 2008

January-08-08, 11:07:05 AM | GreenLight Advisor   A great WSJ.com article by Jonathan Clement recently provided some ideas on how we can make our kids more aware of finance and the value of money so they are better prepared in life. As he says, you may or may not agree with all of his tips, so you decide what they are worth. They are definitely worth sharing. Here are Jonathan Clement’s 12 Ways to make your kids financially saavy: 

1. WAITING UNTIL LATER If children are to grow up to be successful savers and investors, they need to learn two key skills: How to delay gratification and how to take risks prudently. The first is easily the most important. 

Indeed, the self-control needed to delay gratification is associated not only with good saving habits, but also with things like succeeding in school and coping better with frustration and stress. Yet this isn’t an easy skill to teach. Henry and Hannah grew up spending their parents’ cash, so they didn’t have much incentive to curb their desires. My response? Make them feel like they’re spending their own money. 

One of my early tricks was the soda game, which I learned about from a reader. When my children were young and we went to restaurants, I would give them a choice: They could have a soda or they could have $1. Henry and Hannah ended up drinking a lot of water. 

  2. ASKING THEMSELVES 

Emboldened by the soda game’s success, I looked for other ways to apply the same notion. The breakthrough came when Hannah was 14 and Henry was 10. That was when I opened a savings account for each of them. The accounts came with a cash-machine card. Every three months since then, I have deposited pocket money for them in their savings accounts and, as they have grown older, their clothing allowance as well. That way, they’ve had to learn to budget for a three-month period. More important, they no longer ask me for money. 

Instead, if they want to buy something, they have to ask themselves. The effect has been startling. Henry and Hannah almost immediately became more careful spenders. Sound manipulative? You’d better believe it. But I also think of it as financial self-defense. Suppose Henry and Hannah don’t learn good money skills and grow up to be financial deadbeats. If they ended up deeply in debt, I can’t imagine not helping — at which point their financial problems would be mine. 

  3. TALKING THE TALK 

I haven’t just molded Henry and Hannah with financial incentives. I have also used family stories. Values are passed down to our children in the stories we tell. My children may live in an affluent household in an affluent town. But I want them to know that their mother and I struggled financially, and that they will likely have their own struggles. 

So I talk about the mouse- and cockroach-infested Brooklyn apartment where we all lived while their mother worked on her Ph.D. and we squeaked by on a junior reporter’s salary. I tell them about the beaten-up ‘76 Camaro that used to stall if the traffic light stayed red too long. I recount taking them as toddlers to the “toy museum,” otherwise known as FAO Schwarz, where we would play with the dolls and the trains but never buy. Instead of regaling my children with these tales, I could simply lecture them about the virtues of thrift. But the stories pack far more punch. 

  4. SCOFFING AT WEALTH 

I have also encouraged my kids to be suspicious of displays of opulence, whether it’s the big house, the fancy car or the designer clothes. The fact is, this sort of spending doesn’t lead to lasting happiness, but it can create a heap of financial stress. In belittling conspicuous consumption, I may be a little too strident, but there’s a reason. Henry and Hannah may have grown up hearing about the dilapidated Brooklyn apartment. But I grew up hearing a far more powerful story, about my maternal grandfather and his four siblings, who in the 1940s each inherited what today would be millions of dollars. My grandfather’s siblings quickly blew the money on fast cars and high living. My grandfather blew his money more slowly, on horses and cattle farming. Either way, the great family fortune was gone, and reckless spending was largely to blame. 

  5. COMPOUNDING FOR DECADES 

When my children were young, I opened a variable annuity for each of them. This isn’t a product I particularly like, because many have outrageously high annual expenses and charge back-end sales commissions if you sell within, say, the first seven years. Still, there are a few no-load variable annuities with low annual expenses, notably the offerings from Fidelity Investments and Vanguard Group. Moreover, unlike with an individual retirement account, you don’t need earned income to fund a variable annuity, so you can open an account for a toddler. Today, my kids’ low-cost variable annuities are each worth some $37,000. 

I have long been captivated by the idea of starting Henry and Hannah on the road to retirement. Think about it: The dollars I invested when they were youngsters might enjoy six decades of tax-deferred compounding. That’s enough to turn $1 into over $100, assuming an 8% annual return. And thanks to the tax penalty on early withdrawals, my children will be discouraged from touching the money before they are 59½.   

6. GROWING FREE There are far better investment vehicles than a variable annuity, and my chance came a few years ago. Hannah got a job at a local restaurant, which meant she had earned income. That allowed me to open a Roth individual retirement account for her, which will give Hannah tax-free growth. 

Instead, I could have funded a regular IRA, where withdrawals are taxable but you get an initial tax deduction. That tax deduction, however, wouldn’t have been worth much, given Hannah’s low tax rate, so the Roth seemed like a better bet. The money I’ve stashed in my kids’ variable annuities and in Hannah’s Roth IRA won’t be nearly enough to pay for their retirement, especially once you figure in inflation. But fully funding their retirement was never my aim. Rather, the accounts are intended to be a powerful example, showing my children how money will grow if they are willing to sit quietly with a diverse collection of low-cost funds. 

  7. HEADING HOME 

When I bought my first home, my parents helped me financially, and I want to do the same for my kids. To that end, I have invested $15,000 for each of them. Even with a decade or more of growth, that $15,000 probably won’t be nearly enough for a 20% down payment. But it will give them something to build on. 

I stashed Hannah’s $15,000 in a target-date mutual fund that’s geared toward 2010, while Henry’s money is in a 2015 fund. I bought those funds knowing my kids probably won’t buy homes until five or 10 years after those dates. My thinking: Target-date funds typically have around half their money in stocks as of their target date, and then they continue to become more conservative in the years that follow. By the time my kids need their down-payment money, their target-date funds should be largely invested in bonds. 

  8. KEEPING SCORE 

When my kids buy a house, they won’t just need a down payment. They will also want to have a good credit score. With that in mind, I listed Hannah as a joint account holder on my Visa card earlier this year. That meant the card’s credit history was added to her previously blank credit report. 

Suddenly, she looked like a model financial citizen. That allowed her, a few months later, to apply for a Discover card on her own. I now have her on a strict regimen, where she charges a small sum each month and dutifully pays it off, thus slowly building up a good credit score. When Henry reaches college age, I will go through the same nonsense with him. This, alas, is necessary nonsense. The reality is, a good credit score will help my kids get a lower mortgage rate, lower insurance premiums and a host of other financial benefits. 

  9. VOWING TO HELP 

Full disclosure: I am divorced. But even before my marriage broke up, I was horrified by the way many families blow $20,000 or $30,000 on a single day of celebration for a wedding. To put such spending in context, consider this: According to the Federal Reserve’s 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances, more than 96% of households headed by someone 65 to 74 had some savings — but the median value of these financial assets, including things like checking accounts, stocks and mutual funds, was just $36,100. 

Spending $30,000 on a party is not one of my values, and I’ve made sure my kids know it. I have told them I will give them $5,000 toward a wedding or at age 30, whichever comes first. What if they want the $30,000 wedding? They can ask their mother.   

10. LENDING A HAND While an expensive wedding is low on my list of priorities, a good education ranks near the top. My ex-wife and I long ago agreed that we would pay the full cost of our children’s undergraduate education. Again, this was something my parents did for me, and we all tend to be heavily influenced by our parents’ behavior. 

There is, however, a limit to my generosity. I have told Henry and Hannah that, if they want to go on to graduate school, they will have to take out loans. I may relent somewhat when the time comes. But I think that there should be some cost to staying in school, so I am not inclined to continue footing the full tab.   

11. SETTING EXPECTATIONS As you might gather, I have talked to my kids a fair amount about money. They know they will graduate college debt-free, they will get some help toward a house down payment and they will receive just $5,000 toward a wedding. They know about the retirement accounts. I have also promised them $5,000 upon graduating college, to get them started in the world. 

No doubt some folks will think I’m overly generous, while others might consider me cheap. Many will question my priorities. For instance, folks have told me that they would have skipped the retirement accounts and allocated more toward a house down payment. But, frankly, the precise sums aren’t that important. Instead, what I am striving to do is set expectations. By detailing everything to Henry and Hannah, I have made it clear where I think my financial responsibility ends and where theirs will begin. 

  12. GETTING EDUCATED 

Along the way, I have also endeavored to teach my kids about sensible investing. It’s been a slow process. For instance, earlier this decade, I tried a family investment contest. We all picked a mutual fund, I invested $50 a month in each and then we tracked who fared best. I thought the competition would grab their interest, but it wasn’t a great success. Maybe Henry and Hannah were too young. 

Indeed, I have continued to show them their mutual-fund statements as they arrive in the mail, and my kids have grown more interested as they have grown older. They have also become more curious about the financial markets, and I can now chat about investing for at least 30 second